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The United States Supreme Court held that where statutory remedies are
more analogous to those historically awarded in courts of law rather than
courts of equity, the Seventh Amendment, and not the provisions of the
Copyright Act, provides for the right to a jury trial.
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279
(1998).
In 1990, Krypton International Corporation ("Krypton"), owned
by C. Elvin Feltner, acquired three television subsidiaries in the
southeast United States.' These subsidiaries had previously con-
tracted with Columbia Pictures Television for the license to show
several television series in syndication.! Shortly after Feltner ac-
quired the subsidiaries, the Krypton stations defaulted on their
royalty payments to Columbia, and the parties initiated talks to
restructure the initial agreement.' In October of 1991, following
unsuccessful negotiations, Columbia decided to terminate the li-
cense agreements.' Notwithstanding the revocation of the license,
the Krypton stations continued to broadcast the syndicated pro-
1. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct 1279, 1282 (1998). Krypton Inter-
national's subsidiaries are Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., Krypton Broadcasting of
Jacksonville, Inc., and Krypton Broadcasting of Ft. Pierce, Inc. Columbia Pictures Television v.
Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 288 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd, Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279 (1998).
2. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1282. Among the licensed television programs were, "Who's the
Boss?," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T.J. Hooker." Id,
3. Id
4. Id
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grams, and Columbia filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California against Feltner, Krypton and
its stations, various Krypton subsidiaries, and several Krypton offi-
cers.
5
Columbia's complaint alleged multiple causes of action, but,
prior to trial, Columbia dropped all but the claim for copyright in-
fringement.6 As part of the remaining claim, Columbia fied a mo-
tion for summary judgment and sought relief under section 504(c)
of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("the Act"),7 which provides for the
right to recover statutory damages in lieu of actual damages.8
The district court awarded Columbia partial summary judgment
as to Krypton's liability, denied Feltner's request for a jury trial,
and determined the amount of statutory damages from the bench.'
In assessing the number of violations, the trial judge ruled that
each time an episode from the syndicated television series aired, it
constituted a separate work, and as such, he concluded that there
were, in total, 440 acts of infringement."9 Furthermore, the judge
determined that airing the shows were in willful disregard of the
revoked license and set statutory damages at $20,000 per violation,
amounting to $8,800,000, plus costs and attorney's fees."
5. Id
6. Id at n.1.
7. Fe/tner, 118 S. Ct at 1282 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101-1101 (1995)). In addition to the right to
statutory damages, Columbia also pursued a permanent injunction under 17 U.S.C. § 502, per-
manent impoundment of all copies of the programs under 17 U.S.C. § 503, and costs and attor-
ney's fees as provided in 17 U.S.C. § 505. Id. at 1282.
8. Id. Under the Copyright Act, at the election of the copyright holder, statutory
damages may be awarded as an alternative to actual damages at any time prior to final
judgment. Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright
owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to re-
cover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory dam-
ages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one
work,... in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court
considers just....
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving,
and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court
in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of
not more than $100,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden
of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright, the court [in] its discretion may reduce the award of statutory
damages to a sum of not less than $200[.]
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
9. Fe/tner, 118 S. CL at 1282.
10. Id
11. Id. at 1282-83. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), "where the copyright owner sustains the
burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in
128
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Feltner appealed the trial court's decision, alleging that the
court's interpretation of the statute improperly denied his constitu-
tionally protected right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision and specifically
rejected Feltner's argument for a jury determination of statutory
damages. 2 The court denied Feltner's request as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, 3 and, in doing so, the court sided with several
other circuits that have held that statutory damages are equitable
in nature and do not fall within the Seventh Amendment's right to
a jury trial. 4 Recognizing the controversy over the nature of these
damages and the right to a jury trial, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari."
The Court delayed its discussion of the Seventh Amendment
its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum or not more than
$100,000[.]" 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1995). The district court's award of costs and attorney's fees
to Columbia was vacated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further
explanation. Feltner, 118 S. Ct at 1283 n.2.
12. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1283. In addition, the appellate court dismissed Feltner's challenges
as to improper venue and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at
288-90. Moreover, Feltner failed to raise any issue of material fact regarding whether Columbia
validly terminated the license agreements in October of 1991. Id. at 291. Similarly, Feltner's
argument as to Columbia's alleged lack of standing to pursue the copyright claims was not
raised in the trial court and could not be considered on appeal. Id, at 290. Feltner also failed to
present sufficient evidence to support his counterclaims for negligent misrepresentation and
breach of oral contract Id. at 292.
13. Fe/tner, 118 S. CL at 1283. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
relying on the reasoning of its decision in Sid & Marty KroJfi Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). Id. The court stated that if Congress had
intended a different result than that offered by the Kroffl decision, the language of the statute
would have been altered Feltner, 118 S. Ct at 1283 (citing Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 292-
93). Therefore, when the statutory language refers to "the court," the judge shall determine the
amount of damages. Id.
14. Id. (citing Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 292-93). To support its conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit relied on Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d
829, 852-53 (11th Cir. 1990), Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2nd Cir. 1983), Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6, 7 (5th Cir. 1981), Raydiola Music v. Revelation Rob,
Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1990), and Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd, 925 F.2d 1010,
1014-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 (1991). Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 293. These
decisions collectively hold that when parties seek equitable damages, they have no Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. Id Despite its holding that there is no right to a jury trial in
equity, the court did recognize contrary decisions in Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc.,
88 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1996); Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 119-21 (4th Cir. 1981);
and Educational Testing Services v. Katzman, 670 F. Supp. 1237 (D.NJ. 1987). Id.
15. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1283 (citing Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct
30, 138 L Ed. 2d 1059 (1997)). "Certiorari" is a common law writ, issued by a superior court
(most commonly the United States Supreme Court) to a lower court, requiring the latter to
certify and return the record to the superior court for review. Black's Law Dictionary 228 (6th
ed. 1990).
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issue and first addressed whether it would be "fairly possible" to
interpret the statutory language of the present Copyright Act to
provide the right to a jury trial." After analyzing the Act as a whole,
the majority concluded that when other provisions in the Act ref-
erencing "the court" conferred decisional authority on the judge,
consistency in context would permit the judge, and not a jury, to
determine statutory damages. 7 In addition, the majority could find
no support in the Act's legislative history evidencing a Congres-
sional intent to grant the right to a jury trial. 8 As a result, the ma-
jority found it necessary to address the constitutional question. 9
In reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the majority re-
affirmed prior decisions such as Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nord-
berg,9 which held that Seventh Amendment rights apply, not only
to common law causes of action, but also to equitable actions
granted by statutory authority.2 The majority distinguished the
case of Tull v. United States," which deals with Congress' right to
appoint judges as the evaluators of damages in purely statutorily-
16. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1283 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. at 417 (1987)). The
language of
§ 504(c) awards statutory damages that "the court considers just." Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
504(c)) (emphasis added).
17. Id., at 1283-84.
18. Id. at 1284 na5.
19. Id. at 1284. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved[.]" Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. VII).
Although Alexander Hamilton opined that there was no need for a constitutional provision
expressly granting a right to a jury trial and he questioned the right to a jury trial against the
right of liberty, he emphasized the importance of the right to a jury in civil actions. In the Fed-
eralist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton stated in relevant part:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury;
or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the
very palladium of free government. . . . But I must acknowledge that I
cannot readily discern the inseparable connection between the existence
of liberty and the trial by jury in civil cases .... The excellence of the trial
by jury in civil cases appears to depend on circumstances foreign to the
preservation of liberty. The strongest argument in its favor is that it is a
security against corruption. As there is always more time and better op-
portunity to tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a jury
summoned for the occasion, there is room to suppose that a corrupt influ-
ence would more easily find its way to the former than to the latter.
The Federalist No. 83 (Hamilton).
20. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
21. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1284-85 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33
(1989)).
22. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
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created actions.' In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the
jury's function as the judge of damages in actions in equity is simi-
lar to that function in copyright actions historically tried in courts
of law.'
Writing separately in his concurrence, Justice Scalia questioned
the majority's disposition of the Seventh Amendment question,
believing instead that the granting of a jury trial could be "fairly
possible" from the history and wording of the statute itself.25 Jus-
tice Scalia opined that the statutory history clearly showed that
current Copyright Act section 504(c) was a "direct descendant" of
an 1856 copyright statute permitting "action[s] on the case or other
equivalent remed[ies]."26 In interpreting the 1856 statute, which
granted a right to a jury through the language "as to the court shall
appear just," Justice Scalia could see no reason why the language
"as the court considers just" in the present Act should not provide
the same right. 7
The first issue addressed by the Feltner Court was the develop-
ment of the statutory law governing damages in copyright
actions.' Before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the
common laws and statutes of both England and the United States
provided for causes of action for copyright infringement and, when
plaintiffs sought monetary damages, these suits were tried before
juries in courts of law.' Like other suits seeking monetary dam-
ages for invasions of property rights, copyright suits were known
as "actions on the case."'
In England, the first statutory enactment protecting copyrights
came in 1710 under the Statute of Anne, which protected pub-
lished books. Actions brought under this statute were tried in
courts of law before juries, just as were those brought under the
common law.' In the United States, statutory provisions for copy-
right protection were enacted even before the adoption of the
23. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1285.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1288-89 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 n.3).
26. Id. at 1289 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 101, 16
Stat. 214; Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 482).
27. Id, at 1283.
28. Feltner, 118 S. CL at 1283 (citing Tel/, 481 U.S. 412,417 (1987)).
29. Id. at 1285.
30. Id. (citing Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303,2398,98 Eng. Rep. 201,252 (KB. 1769)).
31. Id. (citing 8 Anne cli 19 (1710)).
32. Id.
1998
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Constitution.' In 1783, the Continental Congress passed a resolu-
tion encouraging the states to secure copyright protection for
authors.' Three state statutes that contained similar to sections of
the modem Act specifically authorized an award of damages from
a defined statutory range in an action at law.n
Congress continued development in this area when, in 1790, it
passed the first federal copyright statute authorizing courts of law
to award money damages for copyright infringements.36 This stat-
ute did not change the practice of trying these types of cases be-
fore juries.17 In fact, Congress did not provide for equity jurisdic-
tion until a revision of the Act in 18 19 .' However, even after the
enactment of the revision providing for equity jurisdiction, the Su-
preme Court held that the damages provision could not be en-
forced through suits in equity.39
When the Act was again amended in 1831, only the permissible
minimum and maximum statutory awards changed.' Most of the
original wording of these statutes was retained in revisions or in
new statutes passed in 1856, 1870, and 1897."' However, in 1856
33. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. 1285.
34. Id. (citing U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Enactments: Laws Passed in the United States
Since 1783 Relating to Copyright, Bulletin No. 3, p. 1 (rev. ed 1963)). In response to the 1783
Continental Congress resolution, all states except Delaware enacted copyright statutes protect-
ing the author's rights by providing a cause of action for damages without any reference to
equity jurisdiction Id. Three states, Connecticut, New York and Georgia, specifically stated
that recovery was to be made through actions at law. Id
35. Id. at 1285-86 (citing Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law, 357 (1929)). Stat-
utes in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island permitted damages to be recovered
by "actions of debt," which were actions at law. Id at 1286 (citing U.S. Copyright Office, Copy-
right Enactments: Laws Passed in the United States Since 1783 Relating to Copyright, Bulletin
No.3, p. 1 (rev'd 1967)).
36. Id. (citing Act of May 31, 1790, cl 15, §§ 2, 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125). The first federal copyright
statute set damages for copyright infringement of published works in the amount of "fifty cents
for every sheet which shall be found in [the infringer's] possession,... to be recovered by action
of debt in any court of record in the United States, wherein the same is cognizable." Act of May
31, 1790, § 2. If the manuscript was unpublished, the statute allowed for "all damages occa-
sioned by such injury, to be recovered by a special action on the case founded upon this act, in
any court having cognizance thereof." Act of May 31, 1790, § 6. The court found that, although
the Act of May 31, 1790 was short-lived, there is valuable evidence that damages arising under
copyright infringement were meant to be tried by a jury. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. 1286.
37. Id. (citing Backus v. Gould, 7 How. 798, 802, 12 LEd. 919 (1849); Reed v. Carusi, 20 F.
Cas. 431, No. 11, 642 (D.Md. 1845); Millett v. Snowden, 17 F. Cas. 374, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1844);
Dwight v. Appelton, 8 F. Cas. 183,85 (C.D.N.Y. 1843)).
38. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1286 n.6.
39. See Stevens v. Gladding, 15 LEd. 155 (1855); Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 663 (1888).
40. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16 § 11, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 Stat. 438.
41. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 101, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 214; Act of Jan. 6,
1897, ch. 4, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 Stat. 481, 482.
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Congress first included language, in a statute protecting dramatic
compositions, which suggested that an alternative remedy to
monetary damages might be awarded.42 Particularly, this revision
permitted "the court" to enforce just remedies through "an action
on the case or other equivalent remedy."'
In 1909, in expanding the copyright laws, Congress for the first
time specifically provided for statutory damages in lieu of actual
damages and profits." The relevant language of section 25(b) of
the 1909 Act provided that a copyright plaintiff could recover
[1in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court
shall appear to be just, and assessing such damages as the court may, in
its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in the case of
a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, such damages
shall not exceed the sum of [$200] nor be less than the sum of [$50], and
such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of [$5,000] nor be
less than the sum of [$250].4
After the enlargement of the statute's scope, few courts directly
addressed whether Congress intended to provide for the right to a
jury based solely on its terms.6 One of the few courts to do so was
the Second Circuit in Mail & Express v. Life Publishing Co." In
interpreting the statutory damages provision 1909 Act, the Mail &
Express Court noted that, "[w]hile the language of the provision
42. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 Stat 138, 139.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, cl 320, § 25(b), 60th Cong., 2d. Sess., 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (later
amended and codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101(b)(1976)).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Respondent's Brief at 19-20, Feltner (No. 96-1768). See Mail & Express v. Life Publishing
Co., 192 F. 899 (2nd Cir. 1912) (language permits jury to assess damages within prescribed
amounts); Chapell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957) (no right to jury when
seeking "in lieu of" damages); Cayman Music Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D. Wis.
1975) (no right to jury trial). Id,
47. Mail & Express v. Life Publishing Co., 192 F. 899 (2nd Cir. 1912). The Life Publishing
Company brought this action for the infringement of articles and pictures contained in its peri-
odicals. Mail & Express defended on the grounds that the copyright statute protected only the
portions of the periodicals that were copyrightable. Id Mail & Express reasoned that when a
periodical contains articles or pictures submitted by persons who do not transfer their rights to
the publisher, the periodical's copyright does not cover those submissions. Id. The jury in the
lower court found that, in submitting the pictures and articles, the artists had sold their rights to
the publisher. Id Mail & Express appealed the judge's jury charge requiring the jury to award
at least $250 in damages for each infringement. Id Mail & Express argued that the trial judge
could have taken the question of damages away from the jury and decide the damages himself
because the statute did not specifically authorize the jury the right to award damages. Id. The
Second Circuit upheld the trial judge's decision to direct the jury to assess the statutory dam-
ages because the statutory language did not require the judge to determine the damages himself.
Id.
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quoted is somewhat obscure, we do not think that by the use of the
word 'court' it is required that the judge acting by himself shall as-
sess the damages when a case is presented calling for an award
under the minimum damage clause."' The court held that the bet-
ter interpretation would allow for a jury determination of these
damages within the prescribed limitations."
The Second Circuit continued in this vein in Arnstein v. Porter,'
an action to recover damages for the infringement of musical
composition copyrights and wrongful use of musical titles.5' The
court held that the plaintiffs claim, although founded solely upon
the copyright statute, was specifically for money damages, not eq-
uitable relief, and, therefore, was an action at law. 2 The court rea-
soned that the statutory language did not remove the right to a jury
trial on damages and found that when these actions had histori-
cally been tried before juries, this practice should continue.'
Although a few other decisions do conflict with those of the
Second Circuit,' these came subsequent to the Supreme Court's
ruling in F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc." In
Woolworth, Contemporary Arts brought an action against Wool-
worth for infringement of the copyright of small sculptures and
figurines.' The district court found that the copyright was valid
and had been infringed and awarded the plaintiff statutory dam-
48. Id at 901.
49. Id
50. 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946).
51. Arnstein, 154 F.2d 464. In Arnstein, the plaintiffs complaint alleged copyright infringe-
ment of several musical compositions, infringement of his rights to other uncopyrighted musical
compositions, and wrongful use of titles. Id, Plaintiff filed his complaint and demanded a jury
trial. Id. Defendant denied ever hearing any of plaintiffs compositions or having any acquain-
tance with any persons said to have stolen them. Id, The court disagreed with defendant's
argument that the relief requested in the complaint rendered ajury trial inappropriate. Id.
52. Id. at 468. Applying Rule 1 of the Rules of Practice to § 25 of the 1909 Copyright Act, the
court noted that the "rules of equity practice, so far as they may be applicable, shall be enforced.
... This did not eliminate ajury trial where plaintiff sought no equitable relief." Id at 468 n.2.
53. Id The court likened an action for monetary damages under the Copyright Act to an
action for treble damages under the Sherman Act, which was similarly statutory in nature and
triable as an action at law for which ajury trial was warranted. Id,
54. Respondent's Brief at 19-20, Feltner (No. 96-1268). See Chapell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe
Co., 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957); Cayman Music Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794 (W.D.
Wis. 1975). Id.
55. 344 U.S. 228 (1952).
56. Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 229. Contemporary Arts produced cocker spaniel statuettes that
were marketed mainly through gift and art shops. Id. Woolworth bought 127 dozen cocker
spaniel statuettes from another source and distributed them through its stores. Id Unbe-
knownst to Woolworth, the statuettes it had purchased were copied from Contemporary Arts'
version. Id By marketing the statuettes, Woolworth became an infringer. Id
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ages as provided for in the Act. 7 In reaching his decision, however,
the trial judge excluded most of the testimony offered by Wool-
worth to limit the plaintiffs claim to actual damages. The judge
deemed the testimony concerning actual damages unnecessary
based on the authority granted to him by the statute to award
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages.'
Woolworth appealed the award of statutory damages and the
court of appeals affirmed. 9 The appellate court dismissed Wool-
worth's contention that its action of coming forward with "an un-
disputed admission of its own profit from the infringement," re-
quired the court to limit the plaintiffs recovery to that amount. 9
The appellate court reasoned that the language of the statute was
developed to compensate the plaintiff in situations in which the
rules of law render it difficult or impossible to prove damages or
profits with certainty.6' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether there had been an abuse of discretion.62
In affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court held that although the better practice would have been to
allow the introduction of the testimony and weigh any evidence of
actual damages, the phraseology of the statute (i.e., "the court" and
"the court in its discretion") empowered a judge to award either
actual damages upon sufficient facts or estimated statutory dam-
57. Id. at 229. Section 25(b) of the Act of Mar. 4, 1909 provides, in relevant
part:
By the Act an infringer becomes liable . . . [t]o pay to the copyright pro-
prietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due
to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall
have made from such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff
shall be required to prove sales only, and the defendant shall be required
to prove every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual dam-
ages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just,
and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow
the amounts as hereinafter stated . . . and such damages shall in no
other case exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250,
and shall not be regarded as a penalty[.]
Id. (emphasis added)(citing § 25(b) of the Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 25(b), 60th
Cong., 2d. Sess., 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (later amended and codified at 17 U.S.C. §
101(b)(1976)).
58. Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 229-30. For the court to award actual damages, the parties must
establish two separate elements by sufficient factual evidence. Id. First, as provided in the
statute, the copyright proprietor must prove the damages he sustained are a result of the in-
fringement. Id. Second, the ifringer must present the profits in order to assess liability. Id.
59. Id. at 229.
60. Id. at231.
61. Id. (quoting Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935)).
62. Id. at 229.
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ages within the prescribed limits, whichever is more just.' There-
fore, even when the elements for actual damages could not be es-
tablished, the judge had the discretion, subject to the monetary
range in the statute, to award damages.'
Only seven years after Woolworth, the Supreme Court decided
Beacon Theatres v. Westover." Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc.,
brought suit for alleged antitrust violations and the defendant,
Beacon Theatres, sought by mandamus to require a district judge
to vacate certain orders alleged to deprive it of a jury trial.' Believ-
ing the claims, including the question of competition between the
two theatres, to be mainly equitable, the trial judge denied Bea-
con's request for a jury trial.67 Beacon appealed, and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused the writ, holding that the trial
judge had acted within his proper discretion in denying Beacon's
request for a jury .'
Because it believes that "[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-
finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in
our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care," the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9 Because the right to trial by
jury applies to treble damage suits under the antitrust laws, and
because the Sherman and Clayton Act issues on which Fox sought
a declaration were essentially jury questions, the Supreme Court
reversed.9 In addition, the Court held that, provided that any legal
issues are submitted in a timely manner and a jury is properly re-
quested, the right to a jury trial can never be lost through the prior
adjudication of equitable claims.'
Although these decisions provided the basis for arguments for
and against the right to a jury, none firmly decided the issue. When
63. Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 233-34 (emphasis added).
64. Id, at 233.
65. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Although the Beacon Theatres decision did not directly interpret the
statutory language to grant the right to a jury trial due to a mixture of both legal and equitable
claims, it provided support for the right to a jury trial by holding that the right to a jury trial
could never be waived when a copyright holder seeks equitable relief under the Act. Id.
66. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 501. Fox asked for declaratory relief against Beacon, alleg-
ing a controversy arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act and under the Clayton Act, which
authorizes suits for treble damages against Sherman Act violators. Id.
67. Id. at503.
68. 356 U.S. 956 (1958).
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Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1976, it left untouched the
statutory damages provisions of 17 U.S.C. section 504(c) 72 and, as
seen by the disparate decisions that followed the 1976 revisions,
contrasting interpretations continued. 3 Although these decisions
were divergent in their final holdings, with some courts refusing
jury trials and others granting them, the courts were consistent in
their conviction that the language of the Act did not, itself, grant
the right to a jury trial.' Like the Feltner majority, they believed the
issue to be a constitutional question.
In Tull v. United States,7 the Supreme Court held that "the de-
termination of a civil penalty is not a fundamental element of a jury
trial, and that the Seventh Amendment does not inherently require
a jury trial for that purpose in a civil action."7 7 At issue in Tull were
the civil damages penalties associated with the Clean Water Act. 8
At the trial level, the district court denied Tull's timely demand for
a jury trial in the Government's suit for relief under the Clean Wa-
ter Act, imposed civil penalties, and granted injunctive relief. 9 The
Court of Appeals affirmed, again rejecting Tull's argument that the
Seventh Amendment preserved the right to a jury trial on the civil
damages issue.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the Seventh Amendment guaranteed Tull the right to
ajury trial on both liability and the amount of the penalty when the
Government sought both civil penalties and injunctive relief under
72. Petitioner's Brief, supra at 16. Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) retained the language "the
court" and "in its discretion" from the 1909 Act when awarding statutory damages in lieu of
actual damages. Id The notes and legislative reports from the 1976 revisions of the Act add
nothing to clarify this issue:
"1. As a general rule, where the plaintiff elects to recover statutory
damages, the court is obliged to award between $250 and $10,000. It can
exercise discretion in awarding an amount within that range but, unless
one of the exceptions provided by clause (2) is applicable, it cannot
make an award of less than $250 or of more than $10,000 if the copyright
owner has chosen recovery under section 504(c)."
17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (1995), Historical and Statutory Notes (Notes of the Committee on the Judici-
ary, House Report No. 94-1476).
73. See cases cited, supra notes 14-15.
74. Id.
75. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1283 n.4.
76. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
77. Tu, 481 U.S. at 427.
78. Id. Section 1319(b) of the Clean Water Act authorizes injunctive relief against violators
and section 1319(d) subjects them to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day. Id. at 412
(citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b) and (d)).
79. Id. at 414-15.
80. Id. at 416.
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the Clean Water Act.81 In examining the liability issue, the Court
found that, although the nature of the relief sought was a mixture
of equitable and legal remedies, the case was more analogous to
suits tried before English courts of law than to equity actions and,
therefore, was within the penumbra of the Seventh Amendment.82
However, through an examination of the legislative history of the
Clean Water Act, the Court found that, because Congress clearly
intended for the trial judge to asses the civil penalties under the
Act, there was no Seventh Amendment violation.' Therefore, the
Seventh Amendment guarantees a party such as Tull the right to a
jury determination of whether a violation exists but not as to the
amount at which damages should be fixed.'
However, in cases in which statutory actions were analogous to
those historically tried in courts of law, several decisions, includ-
ing those of the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether and Granfi-
nanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,' have interpreted the Seventh
Amendment to award the right to a jury trial on damages. The
Curtis case dealt with charges for violations of the fair housing
provisions set forth in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.87 At
issue was whether either party was entitled to a jury trial on dam-
ages when the damages provision of Title VIII allowed for equita-
ble and legal relief.'
In Curtis, the petitioner, an African-American woman, brought
her action under section 812 of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that
the respondents, who were white, had refused to rent an apart-
ment to her because of her race in violation of section 804.89 Her
original complaint sought only injunctive relief and punitive dam-
ages; a claim for compensatory damages was later added." Re-
spondents made a timely demand for a jury trial in their answer,
but the district court held that a jury trial was neither authorized
by the Act nor required by the Seventh Amendment and denied the
81. Id. at 414.
82. YU, 481 U.S. at 418. This holding is consistent with that of Beacon Theatres where the
court granted the right to ajury on the liability issue. See supra text accompanying note 67.
83. Tui/, 481 U.S. at 425.
84. Id. at 427.
85. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
86. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
87. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§
3601 et seq. (1994).
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request.9' The court of appeals reversed, deciding that the Seventh
Amendment provides the right to a jury trial, and interpreted the
language of Title VIII of the Act to authorize jury trials, thereby,
avoiding any question of constitutionality.' In affirming the deci-
sion of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court found that the
constitutional question could not be avoided from the language of
the statute but held that, when a cognizable legal claim exists, even
if combined with equitable relief, the Seventh Amendment guaran-
tees the right to a jury determination of damages when requested
by either party.3
In Granfinanciera, a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover an al-
legedly fraudulent money transfer from individuals who had not
submitted a claim against the bankrupt estate.' The individuals
claimed that the Seventh Amendment granted them a right to a
jury trial, notwithstanding a statutory designation of fraudulent
transfer actions as "core proceedings," which are triable by bank-
ruptcy judges sitting without juries.5 Relying on Curtis, the Court
held that, although it was originally intended to preserve the right
to a jury trial as it was known in 1791, the Seventh Amendment
also applied to claims arising under statutes that parallel common
law actions ordinarily decided in law courts in 18th century Eng-
land as opposed to those heard by courts of equity.' Correspond-
ingly, the Feltner decision recognizes the origins of copyright ac-
tions in courts of law and correctly observes those legal rights
within the remedies requested.'
The Second Circuit's early interpretation of the damage provi-
sion in its Mail & Express decision, although not entirely unrea-
sonable, appears to rely more on the history of liability determina-
tions in copyright actions than on an analysis of the statutory lan-
guage. The Second Circuit seemed to question itself in the close of
its opinion, where, in reference to the trial judge's grant of a jury
trial, it added, "if this is not the correct interpretation of the stat-
ute, we fail to see how the defendant was harmed by the action of
the judge in this case."98 Although the defendant was likely not
91Id at 190-91.
92.Id at 191.
93. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196.
94. Gra financiera, 492 U.S. at 36.
95./d
96.Id. at 41-42.
97. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279 (1998).
98. Mail & Express Co. v. Life Publishing Co., 192 F. at 899,901(2nd Cir. 1912).
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harmed by a jury trial, the question remains whether the right was
provided in the statute itself. Unlike the Supreme Court in Feltner,
the Second Circuit failed to consider the section's surrounding
provisions.
Through its review of the sections surrounding section 505(b),
the Feltner majority rightly determined that a consistent interpre-
tation of the term "the court" would require a judge to determine
statutory damages.' Actual and statutory damages are exclusive of
one another and one or the other may be selected by the copyright
holder at any time before the entry of final judgment." Equally
important to the Feltner majority, therefore, was Congress' deci-
sion not to use the term "the court" in specific sections of the Act
that address awards of actual damages.'"' This exclusion seems to
evidence a Congressional intent to have a jury determine actual
damages, whereas the inclusion of "the court" in the statutory
damages provision indicates a preference for the judge to exercise
his or her discretion in fixing statutory damages. Although in deci-
sions handed down after the enactment of the 1976 revisions, the
various circuits came to different conclusions, they were consis-
tent in holding that the statute did not, itself, grant the right to a
jury trial."°2 Congress had ample opportunity to review these judi-
cial interpretations before enacting the 1988 and 1997 amendments
to the Act; significantly, Congress made no changes to the provi-
sions in question. In light thereof, the majority correctly reached
the constitutional question.
In distinguishing the instant case from the constitutional discus-
sion in Tul, the majority relied on the fact that "[niothing in the
language of the Clean Water Act or its legislative history implies
99. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1283-84. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503(a)-(b), 505 (leaving to the "court's"
discretion equitable determinations, such as the granting of hinunctions, impounding of copies,
or imposition of full costs and attorney's fees -- all functions of the judge). Id
100. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1995).
101. Id. Section 504(b), as follows, governs actual damages and profits and makes no
mention of "the court" as judge of damages:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by
him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in
computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the
copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross
revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible ex-
penses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
102. See cases cited supra notes 14-15.
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any congressional intent to grant defendants the right to a jury trial
during the liability or penalty phase of the civil suit proceedings."'"
In Tull, because the Clean Water Act lacked any significant com-
mon law history and was purely statutory in creation, Congress
could assign the penalties phase to the judge without infringing on
the Seventh Amendment." In contrast, substantial common law
history supported the fact that juries had determined the amount
of damages in copyright actions.'°
Moreover, the Feltner Court dismissed as dicta the potentially
sweeping language contained in the second half of the Tu/ deci-
sion." After ruling on the liability issue, the Tull Court noted that
"nothing in [the Seventh Amendment's] language suggests that the
right to a jury trial extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial. And,
the assessment of a civil penalty is not one of the 'most fundamen-
tal elements' required to involve the Seventh Amendment." 7 Felt-
ner clarifies and narrows the Tull decision by focusing on Tull's
true issue: whether Congress could assign the damage determina-
tion to the judge where the action was purely statutory and not
based on long-standing common law."° Because Congress may fix
the civil penalties when creating the statute, it may also confer the
right to determine the amount to the judge." As noted above, the
Copyright Act is clearly distinguishable from the Clean Water Act,
because it is steeped in the common law, under which copyright
actions were tried before juries.
In his concurrence in Feltner, Justice Scalia questioned the ne-
cessity of addressing the constitutionality of the statute and ad-
vanced his belief that the statute can be fairly read to provide for a
jury trial without reaching the Seventh Amendment question."' It
is, of course, possible from common definitions of the term "the
court," to include both judge and jury in its meaning."' However,
Justice Scalia did not propose reading this into the provision."'
Instead, he relied on the language of the 1856 copyright statute,
103. Feltner, 118 S. Ct at 1288. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. at 417 n.3. (1987).
104. ThW, 481 U.S. 426-27.
105. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1288.
106. Id at 1287 n.8.
107. Tu//, 481 U.S. at 426 n.9.
108. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1288. See 7U, 481 U.S. at 426-27.
109. Th41, 481 U.S. at 426-27.
110. Feltner, 118 S. Ct at 1288 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id at 1288 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 318 (5th ed 1979)
and Webster's New International Dictionary 611 (2d ed. 1949) for definitions of "court").
112. Feltner, 118S. Ct. at 1289 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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which provided for actions on the case or other equivalent reme-
dies. 
3
Although Justice Scalia's argument is mindful of the Court's
need to avoid constitutional questions when possible, his reliance
on the language of the 1856 statute is curious. Although the lan-
guage of the 1856 statute may have permitted juries to assess
"other remedies," the specific language that provides for statutory
damages in lieu of actual damages in the present Act was not first
employed until the 1909 Copyright Act. 4 As such, the majority cor-
rectly focused its attention here. In addition, if the argument that
the right to a jury trial should be read into section 504(c) solely on
the basis of its language were to be made, one would be required
to view the provision as separate and distinct from its surrounding
sections, not unlike the analysis offered in the Mail & Express de-
cision. Read in para materia, the Act clearly intends "the court" to
mean "the judge" When the issue is the discretion to award equita-
ble relief."'
In conclusion, the Feltner decision is correctly decided on the
constitutional question. A court cannot read into the statute what
is not provided. The Court rightly distinguished the instant case
from Tull. Since the inception of copyright actions, juries in courts
of law have consistently and appropriately determined damage
awards and, thanks to the Court's decision in Feltner, the Seventh
Amendment continues to protect this right.
P. Gavin Eastgate
113. Id. at 1289.
114. See supra note 46.
115. Feltner, 118 S. Ct. at 1283-84. For example, § 502 provides that the "court" may "grant
temporary and final injunctions," § 503(a) allows "the court" to impound all infringing copies, §
503(b) permits "the court" to "order the destruction or other reasonable disposition" of all in-
fringing copies, and § 505 provides that the "the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of
full costs" of litigation and "the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
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